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ERASED:  STATE BURGLARY CONVICTIONS AS VIOLENT 
FELONIES UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 
ABSTRACT 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e), commonly referred to as the Armed Career Criminal 
Act, imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum federal prison sentence for 
a felon in possession of a firearm previously convicted of three “violent fel-
onies.”  Although at first glance the specific inclusion of burglary in the def-
inition of qualifying offenses appears to encompass any state-law burglary 
conviction, a morass of judicial tinkering has all but erased burglary from the 
statute.  The Armed Career Criminal Act now applies haphazardly based 
solely on whether a defendant’s statute of conviction comports with several 
layers of complex judicially created tests.  As a result, the law subjects some 
defendants to stiff mandatory minimum sentences while others who commit 
identical crimes escape federal prosecution altogether.  Through the lens of 
recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
including an analysis of North Dakota’s burglary statute, this Note will illus-
trate the manifest uncertainty and frequent division among federal appellate 
courts in determining if a state burglary conviction qualifies as a violent fel-
ony.  Furthermore, it will argue that Congress must revisit the Armed Career 
Criminal Act to mandate a conduct-based approach to analyzing burglary 
convictions if the plain meaning of the statute, and its critical purpose of im-
posing uniform prison sentences on dangerous recidivists, is to be preserved.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 4, 2014, a West Fargo, North Dakota police officer ap-
proached a man walking near a red Mitsubishi Eclipse that had been the focus 
of police attention for suspicious activity the day before.1  “Jon,” the man 
said when the officer asked his name, refusing to provide further infor-
mation.2  Because the car lacked registration and a license plate, officers im-
pounded the vehicle.3 
                                                   
1. Brief for Appellee at 3, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir. 
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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After conducting an inventory search, police discovered the car had been 
registered temporarily to Jonathan Lee Kinney, a five-time convicted felon.4  
Under the driver’s seat of the vehicle, carefully wrapped in a handkerchief, 
law enforcement discovered a handgun.5  Several months later in April 2015, 
during a routine probation search of Kinney’s home, law enforcement dis-
covered yet another firearm.6  
North Dakota prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms for 
ten years following the latter of the date of conviction or completion of sen-
tence, imposing a maximum penalty of five years in prison for a violation of 
the statute.7  However, because four of Kinney’s five prior convictions were 
for accomplice to burglary, he instead found himself staring down a manda-
tory minimum sentence of fifteen years in federal prison.8  Kinney’s burglary 
convictions qualified him for the stout penalty created by the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA” or “Act”), a statute enacted to impose uniform and 
severe prison sentences on dangerous repeat felons who continue to illegally 
possess firearms.9 
Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), ACCA, as amended in 1986, subjects a 
felon in possession of a firearm previously convicted of three violent felonies 
to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum federal prison sentence enhancement.10  
In the absence of three qualifying violent felonies, the maximum penalty for 
violating the federal felon in possession of a firearm statute is ten years.11  In 
particular, § 924(e)(2)(B) provides three different routes for a court to find a 
defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony and therefore war-
rants an ACCA enhancement.12  
First, a prior conviction is a violent felony if it “has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
                                                   
4. Id. at 3–4. 
5. Id. at 3. 
6. Brief for Appellee at 4, Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764). 
7. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-09 (West 2017); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-
32-01 (West 2017) (defining the maximum allowable penalty for a class C felony as five years in 
prison). 
8. Brief for Appellee at 6–7, Kinney,—F 3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764). 
9. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 2–3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 
3662 (noting in the context of ACCA “[b]oth Congress and local prosecutors around the nation have 
recognized the importance of incapacitating these repeat offenders”). 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (establishing as unlawful the possession of a firearm by 
a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”); 18 
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) (defining the maximum allowable penalty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g) as ten years imprisonment). 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
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another,” commonly referred to as the force clause.13  Second, a prior con-
viction qualifies if it is burglary, arson, extortion, or involves the use of ex-
plosives, referred to as the enumerated offenses clause.14  Finally, the statute 
states a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another” also qualifies as a violent felony, re-
ferred to as the residual clause.15  The Supreme Court held the residual clause 
invalid as unconstitutionally vague in 2015.16  Accordingly, a conviction 
must now satisfy either the elements clause or the enumerated offenses clause 
to qualify as a violent felony.17  
Ultimately, Kinney provided the government with substantial assistance 
in an ongoing investigation, resulting in the district court imposing a signifi-
cantly reduced sentence of ninety months in federal prison.18  Even so, United 
States v. Kinney illustrates the potency of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 
which often swaps a felon in possession charge that will likely amount to a 
slap on the wrist in state court and replaces it with momentous, life-altering 
consequences.19  ACCA is undoubtedly a critical, and indeed commonly em-
ployed, tool in the arsenal of federal prosecutors.20  But this tool will only 
remain effective so long as it is applied consistently.  That consistency is now 
in serious jeopardy following several recent decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court regarding ACCA’s specific inclusion of burglary as a quali-
fying violent felony.21  
The Supreme Court’s judicially created tests to determine if a state bur-
glary conviction qualifies as the “violent felony” variety of burglary is mind-
bogglingly complex at times and produces wildly inconsistent outcomes from 
federal courts across the country.  The result?  Gaping disparity in sentences 
                                                   
13. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
15. Id. 
16. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
17. See id. 
18. Brief for Appellee at 7, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir. 
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (permitting federal trial courts to impose a sentence lower than a pre-
scribed statutory minimum for substantial assistance to authorities upon motion by the government). 
19. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32 (West 2017), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
20. See DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. ATT’YS ANN. STAT. REP. at 16 (2016) (showing U.S. Attorneys’ 
Offices charged 11,656 defendants with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 in Fiscal Year 2016). 
21. Compare United States v. Bess, 655 F. App’x 518, 520 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding Missouri’s 
second-degree burglary statute divisible and therefore a qualifying ACCA predicate); United States 
v. Sykes, 844 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2016) (same); and United States v. Phillips, 853 F.3d 432, 
435 (8th Cir. 2017) (same), with United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397, 407 (8th Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (holding Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute indivisible and therefore not a qualifying 
ACCA predicate); and United States v. Bell,—F. App’x —, 2018 WL 1834502, at *1 (8th Cir. Apr. 
18, 2018) (same). 
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for defendants convicted under qualifying burglary statutes.22  With the only 
difference being the state of conviction, some defendants face the full brunt 
of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum penalty while others may not face 
federal prosecution at all.23  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
ACCA has all but erased the word “burglary” from the statute, presenting a 
stark example of judicial overreach into the prerogative of Congress.24 
Part II of this Note provides background on the Supreme Court decisions 
that create the modern framework for analyzing whether a state burglary con-
viction qualifies as a violent felony.  Part III analyzes three recent decisions 
from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that attempt to apply the Supreme 
Court’s framework, illustrating multiple splits among the federal courts of 
appeals.  Part IV discusses the impact of the virtual erasure of burglary from 
ACCA and argues that Congress must revisit the Act to endorse conduct-
based inquires for burglary offenses to remold ACCA into the effective law 
enforcement tool the legislative branch originally designed.  Finally, Part V 
concludes this Note. 
II. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE BURGLARY 
CONVICTIONS AS VIOLENT FELONIES 
Four Supreme Court decisions demarcate the evolution of ACCA.  In 
1990, four years after the current version of the Act took effect, Taylor v. 
United States25 determined state burglary statutes had to be the same or nar-
rower than the Court’s sui generis definition of federal generic burglary to 
qualify as ACCA predicates.26  Moreover, Taylor established the categorical 
and modified categorical approaches to test whether state burglary statutes 
comport with that generic federal definition.27  Fifteen years later, Shepard 
v. United States28 conclusively defined the class of documents available for 
                                                   
22. For example, a person convicted of three burglaries in Wisconsin qualifies for an ACCA 
enhancement. United States v. Lamb, 847 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (U.S. 
Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152). Meanwhile, a person convicted of three identical burglaries just across 
the St. Croix River in Minnesota would not qualify for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. United 
States v. McArthur, 850 F 3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017). 
23. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 250183, FED. JUST. STAT., 2014 STAT. TABLES at 11-
12 (2017) (demonstrating United States Attorneys’ Offices decline federal prosecution for weapons 
offenses in 26 3% of cases). 
24. See discussion infra Part IV. 
25. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
26. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. 
27. Id. at 602. 
28. 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
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trial courts to analyze beyond the plain language of a state burglary statute 
for ACCA purposes.29 
Two opinions authored by Justice Kagan provide guideposts for the 
modern analysis of burglary statutes under ACCA: Descamps v. United 
States30 and Mathis v. United States31.  These decisions denote a renewed 
focus on the exact verbiage of state burglary laws to discern whether a statute 
is divisible into separate elements or merely lists indivisible alternative 
means.32  The Supreme Court’s convolution of ACCA’s enumerated offense 
clause has caused considerable headache for the federal judiciary, as evi-
denced by multiple splits among the federal courts of appeals following 
Mathis, addressed in Part III. 
 A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, THE GENERIC FEDERAL DEFINITION 
OF BURGLARY, AND THE CATEGORICAL APPROACHES 
Constructing the framework for the modern treatment of state-law bur-
glary convictions under ACCA necessarily begins with its plain language and 
the prescribed congressional intent behind the statute.  In particular, through 
a protracted, and somewhat dubious, interpretation of the legislative history 
of ACCA, the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States estab-
lished a generic federal definition of burglary as the measuring stick for 
whether a state burglary conviction qualifies as a violent felony.33  To qual-
ify, a state burglary statute must be the same as, or narrower than, the judi-
cially determined generic federal definition of the crime.34  The case also 
articulated two basic tests – the categorical and modified categorical ap-
proaches – to determine if a state burglary statute comports with federal ge-
neric burglary.35  
To illustrate, in Taylor, the defendant challenged the application of the 
fifteen-year ACCA enhancement the district court applied to his sentence.36  
The defendant did not dispute that his prior robbery and assault convictions 
qualified under the force clause but instead argued his two Missouri burglary 
convictions did not qualify as violent felonies because they posed no risk of 
                                                   
29. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. 
30. 570 U.S. 254 (2013). 
31. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
32. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
33. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. 
34. Id. at 602. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 579. 
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physical harm to others.37  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s sen-
tence, concluding the specific use of the word “burglary” in ACCA meant 
the enhancement applied regardless of the state’s definition of the offense.38 
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed, but most importantly, the High 
Court’s burglary definition differed dramatically, setting the stage for dec-
ades of confusion.39  To get to a final definition, Justice Blackmun, writing 
for the majority, examined the legislative history of ACCA extensively.40  
The Ninety-Eighth Congress originally enacted a much narrower version of 
the Act in 1984, specifically applying the sentence enhancement only to con-
victions “for robbery or burglary.”41  The earliest iteration of the statute in-
cluded an explicit definition for a qualifying burglary as “any felony consist-
ing of entering or remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property 
of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State 
offense.”42  
Critically, the modern version of the Act considered in Taylor inexplica-
bly omits a specific definition of burglary.43  Notably, the Senate Report on 
the original Act stated the purpose for explicitly defining burglary was to 
“ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the prerogatives of the States 
in defining their own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable 
on the Federal level in all cases.”44  Rather than assume this later omission 
signaled a shift in congressional intent, the Court dismissed the lack of a def-
inition as an oversight, speculating it “may have been an inadvertent casualty 
of a complex drafting process.”45  
After rejecting each of the various definitional alternatives other federal 
appellate courts and the defendant proffered, the Court arrived at its own de-
finitive definition through the examination of contemporary American crim-
inal law.46  The Court accordingly held sui generis, citing from a lone treatise, 
the generic federal definition of burglary to be “unlawful or unprivileged en-
try into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a 
crime.”47  Even so, the Court still faced the task of establishing a judicial 
                                                   
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See discussion infra Part III. 
40. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 582. 
44. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199. 
45. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589–90. 
46. Id. at 598. 
47. Id. at 599. 
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approach to determine whether a state burglary statute comported with the 
newfound  definition. 
To accomplish this task, the Court explained that if a state burglary stat-
ute had the same elements as generic burglary, or a narrower definition that 
necessarily required finding the generic elements, the statute qualified under 
the categorical approach.48  However, the Court next noted every federal 
court of appeals had held a strict categorical approach applied, meaning 
courts could only compare the language of the statute at issue to the generic 
federal definition.49  Accordingly, the rote and exclusive application of the 
categorical approach precluded courts from examining the underlying facts 
of a prior conviction to determine if the defendant’s conduct met the generic 
definition.50  The Supreme Court, recognizing the obvious constriction im-
posed by the status quo, consequently endorsed an additional test for courts 
to apply if the plain language of the statute swept broader than the generic 
federal definition, later mundanely dubbed the modified categorical ap-
proach.51 
Under the modified categorical approach, a court may find that a bur-
glary offense qualifies as a violent felony if, even though the state statute of 
conviction is broader than the generic federal definition, the jury necessarily 
had to find each element of generic burglary.52  As an example, the Court 
proffered a hypothetical statute that proscribed unlawfully entering both a 
building and an automobile.53  The Court explained if the charging instrument 
and the jury instructions only specified the defendant unlawfully entered a 
building and not an automobile, then it followed that the jury necessarily 
found each element of generic burglary to reach a guilty verdict.54  Thus, the 
Court endorsed the ability of trial judges to look past the language of the 
statute to a narrow class of documents, non-exhaustively including the charg-
ing instrument and jury instructions, to determine if a prior conviction con-
stitutes a violent felony.55  
Although the Taylor Court definitively included charging documents 
and jury instructions as proper sources for trial courts to inquire into, it left 
                                                   
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 600. 
50. Id. at 602. 
51. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
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open whether the modified categorical approach encompassed other trial-rec-
ord documents.56  In 2005, the Supreme Court revisited Taylor for the first 
time to conclusively determine the level of inquiry permissible beyond the 
plain language of a statute when applying an ACCA enhancement.57 
The Shepard Court decided to “adhere to the demanding requirement 
that any sentence under ACCA rest on a showing that a prior conviction ‘nec-
essarily’ involved (and a prior plea necessarily admitted) facts equating to 
generic burglary.”58  Thus, the Court modestly expanded the permissible doc-
uments for examination to include the terms of a plea agreement or the tran-
script of a plea colloquy, in addition to charging documents and jury instruc-
tions.59 
 B. DIVISIBILITY AND ELEMENTS VERSUS MEANS: TOWARD A 
GORDIAN KNOT 
Although the Supreme Court definitively resolved the question of what 
documents trial courts may inquire into, the modified categorical approach 
remained nebulous.  Rather than provide clarity, the Court’s next ACCA de-
cision in 2013, Descamps v. United States, further muddied the waters and 
began the path to erasing “burglary” from the statute.60  Most recently, in 
2016, the Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States placed even more strin-
gent scrutiny on burglary convictions as ACCA predicates, leading to a del-
uge of federal appellate court reviews of state burglary statutes.61 
In Descamps, the Supreme Court scrutinized the application of the mod-
ified categorical approach to California’s burglary statute.62  The plea collo-
quy record showed the defendant burglarized a grocery store, an offense that 
undoubtedly met the elements of generic burglary.63  California’s burglary 
statute was notoriously broad – it did not specify whether the offense required 
unlawful entry, meaning felony burglary under California law could have 
conceivably included offenses such as shoplifting.64  Because of the statute’s 
breadth, it did not qualify as an ACCA predicate under the formal categorical 
approach.65  The federal district court then faithfully applied the modified 
                                                   
56. Id. 
57. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). 
58. Id. at 24. 
59. Id. at 26. 
60. See discussion infra Part IV. 
61. See cases discussed infra Part III. 
62. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 258–59 (2013). 
63. Id. at 259. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 261. 
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categorical approach, examining the defendant’s plea colloquy, one of the 
documents the Supreme Court specifically endorsed just eight years before 
in Shepard.66  The district court found clear evidence from the colloquy that 
the defendant admitted to unlawfully entering a grocery store with the intent 
to commit a crime and applied an ACCA enhancement.67 
Even though the district court complied steadfastly with the modified 
categorical approach, the Supreme Court nevertheless reversed.68  In the first 
of two significant ACCA opinions authored by Justice Kagan, the Court held 
trial courts could not apply the modified categorical approach to California’s 
statute because it was indivisible.69  The Court reasoned the absence of a 
requirement for unlawful entry meant a jury could convict the defendant of 
burglary under California law without finding a necessary element of the ge-
neric offense.70  Requiring a sentencing judge to examine the specific factual 
circumstances of a prior conviction that the jury or plea judge did not neces-
sarily have to find to convict the defendant, the Court explained, ran afoul of 
the modified categorical approach.71  Therefore, even though the plea collo-
quy plainly demonstrated the defendant’s crime satisfied the elements of ge-
neric burglary, the Supreme Court held the modified categorical approach did 
not apply to indivisible statutes.72 
Justice Alito countered the majority’s constriction of burglary as a pred-
icate offense under ACCA with a vociferous dissent.  First, and critical to 
understanding the Court’s later decision in Mathis, Justice Alito argued the 
Court’s assumption that a statute proscribing burglary of a building, vessel, 
or vehicle enumerated separate elements of burglary rested on unstable 
ground.73  He asserted such a statute did not necessarily require a jury to find 
unanimously, or a defendant to admit to a judge during a plea colloquy, the 
specific place burglarized.74  For example, jurors tasked with deliberating a 
burglary charge, but unable to determine unanimously if a defendant broke 
into a building or a vehicle, could nonetheless convict the defendant of bur-
glary under many state statutes.75  Accordingly, what the majority presumed 
to be a clear-cut example of delineated alternative elements in fact potentially 
                                                   
66. Id. at 259; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15 (2005). 
67. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 259. 
68. Id. at 260. 
69. Id. at 278. 
70. Id. at 264–65. 
71. Id. at 265. 
72. Id. at 278. 
73. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 285–86 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
74. Id. at 286. 
75. Id. at 286–87. 
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articulated alternative means of committing the crime.76  Justice Alito ex-
pressed dismay that the majority’s half-hearted divisibility analysis opened 
the door to a strict elements versus means test – a prescient prediction later 
vindicated in Mathis.77 
Significantly, Justice Alito also pointed out that the Court’s holding 
thwarted Taylor because it reverted to a modified categorical approach that 
depended to some extent on the vagaries of state-specific statutes – a princi-
ple Congress explicitly rejected.78  Indeed, the majority’s holding effectively 
eliminated convictions under California’s burglary statute from counting as 
ACCA predicates, rendering conduct in California otherwise punishable in 
qualifying states unusable for the enhancement.79 
In place of the majority’s preclusion of the modified categorical ap-
proach, Justice Alito proffered a streamlined test that would allow a sentenc-
ing court to find a violent felony if “a defendant necessarily admitted or the 
jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the elements of generic 
burglary.”80  Because Descamps admitted he broke into a grocery store with 
the intent to commit theft, Justice Alito asserted the conviction should have 
counted as an ACCA predicate.81   
Moreover, while Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion, he ex-
pressed serious reservations about the Court’s reasoning and acknowledged 
the validity of Justice Alito’s concerns.82  Importantly, he agreed that the dis-
tinction between divisible and indivisible criminal statutes was unclear and 
feared the majority’s decision would invalidate “likely a large number” of 
state burglary statutes as ACCA predicates, forcing legislatures to rewrite 
their laws.83  Justice Kennedy concluded, “If Congress wishes to pursue 
[ACCA] in a proper and efficient way without mandating uniformity among 
the States with respect to their criminal statutes . . . [it] should act at once.”84 
Unfortunately, rather than heed Justice Alito’s strict elements versus 
means test warning, the Court barreled headlong into adopting that very test 
only three years later.85  In Mathis v. United States, the Court declared stat-
utes that merely list alternative means of committing burglary indivisible and 
                                                   
76. Id. at 287. 
77. Id. at 293; see generally Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
78. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 293 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 281. 
81. Id. at 296. 
82. See id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
83. Id. 
84. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 279. 
85. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). 
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thus incompatible with the modified categorical approach.86  The result ex-
acerbated Justice Kennedy’s fears, today making a trial court’s determination 
as to whether burglary convictions qualify as ACCA predicates almost 
wholly dependent on the exact wording of state law – a result Congress 
overtly intended to avoid.87 
In Mathis, the Court examined Iowa’s burglary statute. The law crimi-
nalized not only burglarizing a building or other structure, but also land, wa-
ter, or air vehicles.88  The government and the defendant agreed the statute 
failed the formal categorical approach because the Iowa statute swept broader 
than the generic federal definition of burglary on its face.89  The government 
instead argued the defendant’s five prior burglary convictions qualified as 
violent felonies because the Shepard documents for each conviction showed 
the defendant burglarized structures, not vehicles.90  The Eighth Circuit sided 
with the government, finding the modified categorical approach applied even 
if the statute listed alternative means.91  Accordingly, the appeals court ap-
plied the modified categorical approach and affirmed the ACCA enhance-
ment.92 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute 
indivisible because it listed the burglary of a building or other structure and 
the burglary of a vehicle as alternative means of committing the crime.93  Jus-
tice Kagan, again writing for the Court, explained that the text and legislative 
history of ACCA favored focusing exclusively on the elements of an offense, 
                                                   
86. Id. at 2257. 
87. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990) (interpreting Congressional intent 
behind the 1986 amendments to ACCA as “extending the range of predicate offenses to all crimes 
having certain common characteristics . . . regardless of how they were labeled by state law.”); see 
also S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199 (stating a purpose 
for the inclusion of burglary in ACCA as being to “ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the 
prerogatives of the States in defining their own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable 
on the Federal level in all cases.”). 
88. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 2250–51. The Court noted the Eighth Circuit’s Mathis decision widened a circuit 
split. Compare United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding statutes listing al-
ternative means qualified as predicate ACCA felonies under the modified categorical approach); 
United States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); and United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 
1046 (10th Cir. 2014) (same), with Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding stat-
utes listing alternative means precluded application of the modified categorical approach); and 
Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2014) (same). 
93. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251. 
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not its underlying factual circumstances.94  The Court reasoned ACCA’s lan-
guage applied the enhancement only for “previous convictions,” not for 
simply committing the offense regardless of the conclusion of a trier of fact, 
accordingly precluding circumstance-specific inquiries.95  Therefore, the 
Court held the Eighth Circuit erred in applying the modified categorical ap-
proach to Iowa’s burglary statute.96 
Much like the Taylor Court articulated tests for when a burglary convic-
tion qualified as an ACCA predicate, the Mathis Court had to enunciate a 
standard for when a statute listed separate elements of burglary versus alter-
native means of committing the crime.97  First, the Court explained if state 
case law has explicitly held a burglary statute lists alternative elements or 
alternative means, that interpretation quickly dispenses with the issue.98  
Conveniently, the Iowa Supreme Court had previously held the state’s bur-
glary statute enumerated “alternative methods” of committing burglary, re-
solving the issue and precluding the application of the modified categorical 
approach.99  
Inconveniently, not a single state high court other than Iowa’s had de-
finitively ruled as to whether their state’s burglary statute listed alternative 
elements or means.100  In the absence of case law, the Court explained the 
plain language of a state statute could also shed light on the elements versus 
means distinction.101  For example, if a burglary statute ascribes different 
criminal penalties for violations of the various alternatives, then the alterna-
tives would be separate elements.102  On the other hand, if the alternatives 
simply list “illustrative examples” of methods for committing burglary, then 
those examples would be means.103  Penultimately, in a seeming about-face 
                                                   
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 2252. 
96. Id. at 2253. 
97. Id. at 2256. 
98. Id. 
99. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (noting further the “alternative methods” designation by the 
Iowa Supreme Court meant the statute did not require jury unanimity as to whether the location 
burglarized was a building, other structure, or vehicle). 
100. Id. at 2269 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion). 
102. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Court has frequently inti-
mated, but never explicitly held, that Apprendi poses Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury issues 
in the context of fact-specific inquires under ACCA. See generally Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, a 
True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 
1275, 1295–98 (2017). For the limited purpose of examining state burglary convictions as violent 
felonies under ACCA, this Note does not examine these Sixth Amendment concerns in detail. 
103. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. 
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from Taylor and Shepard, the Court endorsed a “peek” at the record docu-
ments not to determine if the jury or plea judge necessarily found the defend-
ant committed generic burglary, but rather only for the extremely narrow pur-
pose of discerning whether the statute in fact listed alternative elements for 
burglary.104  Finally, the Court admitted in situations where both the statute 
and the record failed to provide clarity, Taylor’s “demand for certainty” 
simply ruled out the application of an ACCA enhancement altogether.105 
Justice Kennedy again joined the majority decision, believing it to accu-
rately reflect the Court’s ACCA precedent.106  But he wrote separately to 
express serious doubt about the direction of that precedent, characterizing the 
decision as a “stark illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results pro-
duced by applying an elements based approach to this sentencing scheme.”107  
He asserted Congress simply could not have intended to subject the same 
criminal conduct to wide disparities in sentencing based on the specific word-
ing of state law and advocated for revisiting the Court’s ACCA decisions.108 
Mathis also drew two dissents, one from Justice Breyer and another from 
Justice Alito.  Although Justice Breyer joined the majority in Descamps, he 
asserted the Court’s decision to preclude the application of the modified cat-
egorical approach to any statute that lists alternative means went too far.109  
He argued the trial court’s finding – through the documents specifically en-
dorsed in Taylor and Shepard – that the defendant had in fact committed ge-
neric burglary should have been enough to satisfy the ACCA requirement.110  
Poignantly, Justice Breyer cited to eight state burglary statutes nearly identi-
cal to Iowa’s that the Court’s decision jeopardized and argued Taylor re-
quired ACCA burglary to reflect the laws of most states.111  Finally, he as-
serted most prosecutors clearly allege the means a defendant employs in 
committing a crime, intimating a jury oftentimes still necessarily finds ge-
neric burglary under an indivisible statute.112 
Justice Alito penned a scathing dissent, using a hypothetical plea collo-
quy as an example of what he asserted was the absurdity of the majority’s 
                                                   
104. Id. at 2256–57 (citing Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc)). 
105. Id. at 2257. 
106. Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 2260. 
111. Id. at 2263–64; see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-6-201, 45-6-204 (West 
2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-22-02, 12.1-22-06 (West 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 
22-32-1, 22-32-3, 22-32-8 (2017). 
112. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2264 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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elements versus means conclusion.113  The hypothetical presented a trial 
judge repeatedly asking a defendant whether he had burglarized a building.114  
After the defendant admitted to burglarizing a house at 10 Main Street, the 
fictitious judge proceeded to ask questions such as, “Could it have actually 
been a boat?” and “Is 10 Main Street possibly a vehicle?” to which the de-
fendant consistently responded the burglary took place in a house.115  Justice 
Alito’s point, of course, was that even when a defendant unequivocally, ab-
solutely admits to an offense containing the elements of generic burglary, the 
Court’s holding barred the application of an ACCA enhancement simply be-
cause the state’s statute listed alternative means of committing the crime.116 
With the sheer volume of guidance the Supreme Court has provided 
lower federal courts, determining when a state burglary conviction qualifies 
as a violent felony under ACCA should be “easy” for federal sentencing 
judges, as Justice Kagan predicted.117  Dishearteningly, the reality has been 
much closer to Justice Alito’s dissenting wish to judges tasked with applying 
ACCA — “good luck.”118 
III. POST-MATHIS EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS INVALIDATING 
STATE BURGLARY STATUTES AS PREDICATE FELONIES 
Instead of providing clarity to federal appellate courts, Mathis has pro-
duced multiple circuit splits and inconsistency across the board.119  Moreo-
ver, federal courts of appeals have scrambled frenetically to revisit state bur-
glary statutes long held to qualify as ACCA predicates, invalidating many.120  
A flurry of recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions illustrates this 
trend. The Eighth Circuit’s analysis of three state burglary statutes highlights 
two circuit splits directly resulting from Mathis.121  More importantly, the 
overwhelming result of Mathis has been the erasure of state burglary convic-
tions as qualifying violent felonies under ACCA.122 
                                                   
113. Id. at 2270 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 2271. 
117. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion). 
118. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
119. See infra notes 134, 142. 
120. See infra note 170. 
121. See, e.g., Recent Case, Criminal Law – Armed Career Criminal Act – Eighth Circuit 
Holds that Generic Burglary Requires Intent at First Moment of Trespass, 131 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
645 (2017). 
122. See discussion infra Part III.A–C. 
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 A. MINNESOTA: UNITED STATES V. MCARTHUR 
One of the Eighth Circuit’s first decisions invalidating a burglary statute 
as an ACCA predicate came only seven months after Mathis.123  In United 
States v. McArthur, William Morris, one of three defendants in the case, chal-
lenged the application of an ACCA enhancement to his sentence, arguing his 
third-degree Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felo-
nies.124  The court determined the Minnesota statute listed alternative means 
of committing burglary, which reads: 
 
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to steal 
or commit any felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building, 
or enters a building without consent and steals or commits a felony 
or gross misdemeanor while in the building . . . commits burglary in 
the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more 
than five years.125 
 
Although the first clause, requiring intent to commit a crime, contains the 
generic elements of burglary, the second clause does not require intent and 
therefore sweeps broader than generic federal burglary.126  Thus, the case 
hinged on whether the statute was divisible into separate elements or simply 
listed alternative means to commit the offense.127 
Just one year earlier, the disjunctive “or” separating the first and second 
offense clauses convinced the court that the exact same statute listed alterna-
tive elements.128  But Mathis demanded a different outcome.129  The court 
pointed to an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decision holding jury 
unanimity on the defendant’s intent, or lack thereof, to commit a crime was 
not required for a third-degree burglary conviction.130  Accordingly, the court 
                                                   
123. United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017). 
124. Id. at 937. 
125. Id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582(3) (West 2017). 
126. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 938. 
127. Id. 
128. See United States v. McArthur, 836 F.3d 931, 943 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating without expla-
nation that Minnesota’s third-degree burglary statute “is divisible.”), amended and superseded by 
McArthur, 850 F.3d 925. 
129. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 938 (“Here, Mathis requires us to treat the alternatives in the Min-
nesota third-degree burglary statute as ‘means’ rather than ‘elements.’”). 
130. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Gonzales, No. A15-0975, 2016 WL 3222795, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jun. 13, 2016)). 
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held the statute listed alternative means, compelling the court to examine the 
statute under only the formal categorical approach.131 
Notwithstanding the inability to use the modified categorical approach, 
the government argued the generic federal definition of burglary was broad 
enough to encompass the second alternative categorically because an of-
fender necessarily formed the intent to commit a crime while “remaining in” 
the building or occupied structure.132  The court disagreed with the govern-
ment’s position, reasoning that to qualify as generic burglary, a defendant 
had to form the intent to commit a crime before trespassing, whether by un-
lawful entry or remaining past the owner’s consent.133  The court also pointed 
to a circuit split on the issue, with the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals finding no intent required at the time of the trespass, and the Fifth 
and the Eighth finding the opposite.134  Consequently, the court held Morris’ 
conviction did not qualify as an ACCA predicate.135 
 B. ARKANSAS: UNITED STATES V. SIMS 
Less than three months after McArthur, the Eighth Circuit invalidated 
yet another state burglary statute as a qualifying offense under ACCA.136  In 
United States v. Sims, the court considered Arkansas’ residential burglary 
statute, codified as “enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a residential oc-
cupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the 
residential occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment.”137  
The court focused its attention on the phrase “residential occupiable struc-
ture,” which state law defined as a “vehicle, building, or other structure: (i) 
[i]n which any person lives; or (ii) [t]hat is customarily used for overnight 
accommodation of a person whether or not a person is actually present.”138 
The Supreme Court in Mathis stated burglary statutes encompassing 
land, air, or water vehicles swept broader than the generic federal definition 
of burglary.139  However, the government argued that because the Arkansas 
                                                   
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 939. 
133. Id. at 940. 
134. Id. at 939; compare United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 685 (6th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188, 192–194 (4th Cir. 2012), with McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939; United 
States v. Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007). 
135. Id. 
136. United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2017). 
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (West 2017). 
138. Sims, 854 F.3d at 1039 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-101(4)(A)); see also ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-39-101(8)(A) (defining “residential occupiable structure”). 
139. Sims, 854 F.3d at 1040 (citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2250 (2016)). 
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statute only proscribed the burglary of vehicles used as living accommoda-
tions, the provision fit within the “occupied structure” language of the generic 
federal definition.140  Again, the appeals court pointed to a circuit split Mathis 
exacerbated.141  For example, the Tenth Circuit concluded burglary of vehi-
cles “adopted for overnight accommodation” constituted generic burglary of 
an occupied structure while the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits rejected similar 
arguments.142  Relying on its prior decision in United States v. Lamb,143 
which held burglary of a motor home was broader than generic burglary, the 
court rejected the government’s argument and precluded application of the 
modified categorical approach to the Arkansas residential burglary statute.144 
 C. NORTH DAKOTA: UNITED STATES V. KINNEY 
Circling back to Jonathan Kinney, following the district court’s imposi-
tion of a ninety-month federal prison sentence, he challenged the application 
of the ACCA enhancement in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.145  Kinney 
argued North Dakota’s burglary statute was overbroad because, like the Ar-
kansas statute, the term “occupied structure” included vehicles.146  The North 
Dakota burglary statute reads as follows: 
 
A person is guilty of burglary if he willfully enters or surreptitiously 
remains in a building or occupied structure, or a separately secured 
or occupied portion thereof, when at the time the premises are not 
open to the public and the actor is not licensed, invited, or otherwise 
privileged to enter or remain as the case may be, with intent to com-
mit a crime therein.147 
 
At first blush, the statute appears to mirror the generic federal definition 
almost exactly, and indeed the district court explicitly stated as much.148  The 
North Dakota statute plainly satisfies the first and third elements of generic 
                                                   
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Compare United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 146–62 (10th Cir. 1996), with Sims, 854 
F.3d at 1040; United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 444–46 (4th Cir. 2016); and United States v. 
Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
143. 847 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152). 
144. Sims, 854 F.3d at 1040. 
145. Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Kinney,—F 3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir. 
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764). 
146. Id. at 5. 
147. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.  § 12.1-22-02(1) (West 2017). 
148. Brief for Appellee at 7, Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764). 
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burglary because it requires unlawful entry and intent to commit a crime prior 
to trespassing.149  Yet, the “building or occupied structure” element posed a 
problem. Buried one layer deeper in the Century Code, “occupied structure” 
is defined as: 
 
A structure or vehicle: 
a. Where any person lives or carries on business or other call-
ing; or  
b. Which is used for overnight accommodation of persons. 
c. Any such structure or vehicle is deemed to be “occupied” 
regardless of whether a person is actually present.150 
 
Accordingly, Kinney raised two issues for the court to consider: (1) 
whether the “building or structure” element of generic burglary encompassed 
vehicles used only for living or business purposes under the categorical ap-
proach; and (2) if not, whether the “building or occupied structure” language 
in the North Dakota statute was divisible into separate elements and thus 
amenable to analysis under the modified categorical approach.151  The Eighth 
Circuit resolved both of these issues in two separate decisions, leading to the 
demise of North Dakota’s burglary statute as an ACCA predicate.152 
The Eighth Circuit quickly answered the first question.  Kinney and the 
government filed briefs for the appeal prior to the decision in United States 
v. Sims, which conclusively held vehicles used for living accommodations do 
not satisfy the “occupied structure” element of generic burglary, as explained 
above.153  Accordingly, the court held the North Dakota statute was categor-
ically broader than generic burglary.154 
The Eighth Circuit settled the thornier issue, whether the North Dakota 
statute was divisible, when it decided United States v. Naylor, an en banc 
decision examining nearly identical “building or inhabitable structure” lan-
guage in Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute.155  Naylor relied heavily 
                                                   
149. Id. at 18–19. 
150. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-22-06(4) (West 2017) (emphasis added). 
151. See Brief for Appellee at 18, 27, Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (No. 16-3764). 
152. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *3. 
153. United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. 
Lamb, 847 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152). 
154. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *2. 
155. United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
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on state case law to conclude that the “building or inhabitable structure” lan-
guage constituted alternative means, even though “Missouri courts ha[d] not 
yet decided the precise issue.”156  Notably, Naylor’s reasoning appears to 
significantly expand the scope of decisional law available for review to de-
termine divisibility. Mathis only endorsed looking to case law that “defini-
tively answers” the elements versus means question.157  But the Eighth Cir-
cuit went far beyond that, relying on “Missouri’s well-established rule that 
disjunctive phrases in criminal statutes should be treated as methods of com-
mitting a single crime” emanating from multiple decisions.158  True to form 
for ACCA decisions, Naylor drew two dissents.  Judge Loken in particular 
argued the majority impermissibly construed Mathis as overruling Taylor by 
entirely disallowing review of the trial-record documents in favor of exam-
ining case law and model jury instructions.159  He also asserted the decision 
came to “a result so contrary to the obvious intent of Congress as to constitute 
judicial legislation that is beyond our Article III powers.”160  Nonetheless, 
the court held Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute was indivisible and 
therefore did not qualify as a violent felony.161 
As a result, the government’s primary argument in Kinney for the North 
Dakota burglary statute’s divisibility – the existence of the disjunctive “or” 
separating “building” from “occupied structure” – did not persuade the 
panel.162  In a footnote, the court explained the disjunctive “or” did not con-
clusively establish divisibility, but instead merely triggered the elements ver-
sus means analysis.163  Even prior to Naylor, a careful reading of the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in McArthur likely doomed the North Dakota statute.  
There, the court reissued a previously rendered opinion specifically to ad-
dress a similar issue in Minnesota’s burglary statute.164  Despite the existence 
of a disjunctive “or,” the court nevertheless found “Mathis requires us to treat 
the alternatives . . . as ‘means’ rather than ‘elements.’”165  Perhaps most con-
vincingly, Justice Breyer explicitly pointed to North Dakota’s burglary stat-
ute as being “very much like” the Iowa statute the Supreme Court invalidated 
                                                   
156. Id. at 402. 
157. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016). 
158. Naylor, 887 F.3d at 402. 
159. Id. at 409 (Loken, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 406–07 (majority opinion). 
162. Brief for Appellee at 29, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir. 
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764). 
163. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *3 n.1. 
164. See United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 938 (8th Cir. 2017). 
165. Id. 
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in Mathis.166  After finding state case law and the plain language of the North 
Dakota statute unhelpful, the Kinney court resorted to a “peek” at the trial 
record documents.167  The indictment charged the defendant with burgling “a 
building or occupied structure” without specificity.168  Therefore, the court 
determined the statute listed alternative means and invalidated the North Da-
kota burglary statute as a qualifying ACCA offense.169 
IV. EFFECT OF THE ABROGRATION OF BURGLARY AS A 
QUALIFYING ENUMERATED OFFENSE 
With the Eighth Circuit’s recent nullification of the North Dakota and 
Missouri statutes, burglary convictions in only two of seven states under the 
court’s jurisdiction now qualify as violent felonies.170  From a law intended 
to uniformly punish “the same type of conduct” across the nation, to a law 
that today punishes based largely on which side of a river the defendant com-
mits burglary on, the modern application of ACCA is a judicial disaster.171  
Mathis and its lower court progeny now wreak two kinds of havoc.  First, the 
Act’s application flies in the face of a bedrock tenet of the American justice 
system: fairness.  The imposition of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum fed-
eral prison sentence applies erratically – harming, not helping, unwitting de-
fendants caught on the wrong side of a state line.172  Second, the Supreme 
Court’s virtual elimination of burglary as a violent felony from a statute that 
manifestly, unquestionably includes burglary, represents a frightening end-
around of the separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary.173  
Consequently, the time has come for Congress to reassert its authority and 
resurrect ACCA as an effective law enforcement tool. 
 
 
                                                   
166. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2263 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
167. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772, at *3. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (majority opinion) (Iowa); Kinney,—F 3d —, 2018 WL 
1903772 (North Dakota); United States v. Naylor, 887 F 3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Mis-
souri); United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2017) (Arkansas); United States v. McArthur, 
850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017) (Minnesota). 
171. Compare United States v. Lamb, 847 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2017) (No. 17-5152), with McArthur, 850 F.3d at 940. 
172. See cases cited supra, note 171. 
173. See Michael M. Pacheo, Comment, The Armed Career Criminal Act: When Burglary Is 
Not Burglary, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 171, 190 (1989) (arguing an interpretation of burglary under 
the Act exclusive of most states’ burglary statutes “would lead to an absurd result.”). 
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 A. FLAWS IN THE MODERN APPLICATION OF THE ARMED 
CAREER  CRIMINAL ACT 
When adopting the generic federal definition of burglary, the Supreme 
Court hoped defendants would be “protected . . . from the unfairness of hav-
ing enhancement depend upon the label employed by the State of convic-
tion.”174  Twenty-eight years after Taylor, the verdict is in – the Court failed.  
Today, more than any other time in its three-decade history, the application 
of ACCA is unjust. 
First, the modern application of the Act is arbitrary, depending almost 
exclusively on the precise verbiage of state law.175  This despite overt Con-
gressional intent to ensure “the same type of conduct is punishable on the 
Federal level in all cases.”176  In the wake of Mathis, it no longer matters 
whether a defendant like Jonathan Kinney plainly admits to burglarizing a 
grocery store or storage unit – conduct that no doubt satisfies the generic 
definition of burglary.177  A court’s consideration is now limited almost ex-
clusively to the words of the statute in front of it, the very “vagaries of state 
law” both Congress and the Supreme Court sought to avoid.178  The murki-
ness of ACCA is most frightening for defendants, those with the most to lose 
from its arbitrary application.  Predictability of outcome is a paramount pur-
pose of law – ACCA today offers none.179 
The present application of ACCA is also patently unfair to defendants 
unfortunate enough to have three burglary convictions in a state with a qual-
ifying statute.  Why should a person who sticks up three grocery stores in 
Wisconsin receive fifteen years in prison while a person who does the same 
in Minnesota receives less than one?180  Here, ACCA throws “fundamental 
                                                   
174. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990). 
175. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 293 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
176. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199 (emphasis 
added). 
177. Brief for Appellee at 3–5, United States v. Kinney,—F.3d —, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th 
Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) (No. 16-3764). 
178. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) (explaining analysis under ACCA 
“involves, and involves only, comparing elements”). 
179. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (“Besides its centrality to the rule of law in general, consistency has a spe-
cial role to play in judge-made law – both judge-pronounced common law and judge-pronounced 
determinations of the application of statutory and constitutional provisions.”); see also cases cited 
supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
180. Because the Minnesota statute does not qualify as an ACCA predicate, convicted burglars 
unlawfully in possession of firearms in Minnesota are subject only to state criminal penalties. MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 624.713(2)(c) (West 2017); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02(3) (West 2017) 
(defining gross misdemeanor as an offense carrying a sentence of more than ninety days, but less 
than one year). 
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fairness,” an express aim of Congress when enacting the statute, to the 
wind.181  Still, some commentators have enthusiastically welcomed the abro-
gation of burglary convictions as qualifying ACCA offenses in the name of 
“soften[ing] the edges of harsh federal sentencing practices.”182  Reducing 
the length of prison sentences is certainly a worthy goal.  But placing that 
goal above the basic fairness of our justice system is a price too steep to pay.  
Although the net result of Mathis and its progeny will certainly be fewer 
ACCA sentences, thousands of defendants will remain incarcerated for the 
duration of a fifteen-year term while others who committed identical crimes 
go free.183  The sole difference for those left behind will be their state of 
conviction. 
Furthermore, with the onslaught of state burglary statutes invalidated af-
ter Mathis, judicial interpretation of the statute now thwarts ACCA’s plain 
language.184  The Taylor Court benevolently noted its generic definition 
struck a balance “roughly corresponding to the definitions of burglary in a 
majority of States’ criminal codes.”185  As the paltry number of qualifying 
burglary statutes in the Eighth Circuit now demonstrates, the Court’s ele-
ments versus means test falls far short of this goal as well.186  As a result, the 
mandate that “burglary” qualify as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is now gutted, left to the flimsy distinction between elements 
and means, a distinction state legislatures could not possibly have anticipated 
when drafting burglary statutes.187  The Court has now all but erased a class 
of offenses Congress unequivocally included in a sentencing scheme.188  The 
Court’s usurpation of legislative authority is exacerbated because burglary 
was one of only two crimes that triggered ACCA enhancement in the original 
iteration of the statute.189  
The Supreme Court’s eagerness to discard the plain language of ACCA 
is all the more perplexing because Mathis bucked the Court’s own precedent. 
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Justice Kagan’s Mathis opinion concluded “we have repeatedly made clear 
that application of ACCA involves, and involves only, comparing ele-
ments.”190  If this had indeed been the Court’s stance “[f]or more than 25 
years,” then the federal district and appellate courts tasked with the everyday 
administration of ACCA sentences missed the memo.191  Had an elements-
only approach truly represented the Court’s uninterrupted precedent from 
ACCA’s enactment onward, Mathis would have changed nothing.  Instead, 
it has resulted in the annulment of almost every state burglary statute in the 
Eighth Circuit in less than two years.192 
 B. CONGRESS MUST REVISIT THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL 
ACT TO ENDORSE CONDUCT-BASED INQUIRIES 
The judicially created imbroglio that is the modern ACCA demands 
Congressional action.  Twice in the last five years, Justice Kennedy has ex-
plicitly called for the legislative branch to provide clarity.193  Most recently, 
he expressed dismay at the ability of Congress to respond in his Mathis con-
currence, and even signaled the Court should revisit its ACCA decisions in 
the future.194  Despite Justice Kennedy’s pessimism for Congressional action, 
less than two months after the announcement of Mathis, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission submitted a report to Congress on recidivist sentence enhance-
ments that has already spurred the seeds of change.195  
In the report, the Commission relayed its decision to eliminate burglary 
as a “crime of violence” under the career offender sentencing guidelines and 
urged Congress to adopt a similar stance for the definition of “violent felony” 
under ACCA for uniformity.196  However, the purpose of ACCA is funda-
mentally different from the career offender guidelines.197  The “crime of vi-
olence” provision is aimed squarely at violent recidivism, whereas ACCA is 
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concerned with both violent crime and significant harm to property.198  In-
deed, the House report on the original version of ACCA labeled burglaries as 
“the most damaging crimes to society” specifically because of their violent 
nature and ruinous impact on property.199  Eliminating burglary would di-
rectly contravene the genesis for enacting ACCA in the first place, leaving a 
wide gap in federal law enforcement capabilities.200 
Accordingly, Congress should permit federal sentencing judges to em-
ploy conduct-based inquires for ACCA purposes.201  As Justice Alito stated 
in Descamps, “When it is clear that a defendant necessarily admitted or the 
jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the elements of generic 
burglary, the conviction should qualify.”202  ACCA’s predicament does  not 
result from the definition the Supreme Court selected, even though it is highly 
questionable that Congress intended for a generic definition of burglary.  The 
true dilemma is the method used to determine if that definition is satisfied.203  
A conduct-based inquiry, wielding only the documents endorsed in Taylor 
and Shepard, would return ACCA to punishing “the same conduct” uni-
formly.204  In endorsing Justice Alito’s approach, Congress can ensure fun-
damental fairness in the application of the law and renew ACCA’s effective-
ness as a tool to keep Americans safe. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act’s nearly three-decade history is a mi-
crocosm of several important debates in our society, ranging from recidivism 
and mass incarceration to the separation of powers between co-equal 
branches of government.  Mathis and the slew of federal appellate decisions 
it has spawned sharpen those debates exponentially.205  Of particular note to 
local practitioners, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently invalidated 
North Dakota’s burglary statute as a violent felony for ACCA purposes.206  
As a result, Kinney will touch off a firestorm of litigation for federal criminal 
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law practitioners in North Dakota. And it has eliminated yet another statute 
from a sentencing scheme unquestionably intended to encompass burglary 
convictions from its inception.207  The onus now falls on Congress to wrangle 
the runaway application of ACCA back from the judiciary.  Every moment 
of delay perpetuates the unequal application of a law that exacts retribution 
in fifteen-year increments.   
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